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INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person shall be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony.' The
words "no person" appear to make this privilege universally applicable.
Courts, however, generally accept grants of immunity as satisfying this
constitutional guarantee, because the guarantee of immunity is considered coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.2 When a
witness fears that his testimony may be used against him in a foreign
proceeding, satisfying the standards of the fifth amendment becomes dif1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment reads in part: "No person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
2. A grant of immunity is valid only if it is coextensive with the self-incrimination
privilege. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). In other words, a grant of
immunity, sealing orders and other protective measures must provide the same amount of
protection as would the fifth amendment.
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ficult since domestic grants of immunity cannot shield a witness from
foreign prosecution. Furthermore, although courts issue sealing orders to
prevent the release of immune testimony, their effectiveness is
questionable.
Domestic courts are reluctant to address the issue of whether the protections of the fifth amendment extend to persons refusing to testify because they fear foreign prosecution. Courts that favor gathering information over respecting individual rights tend to focus on sealing orders and
other procedural protections, rather than on the right itself. Just as a
grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege, 3 so must other
protections. Thus, determining the scope of the privilege is necessary in
order to understand whether other protections are adequate. In dispensing with cases that present this issue, most courts have failed to address
the constitutional question. Addressing this question, however, is essential to understanding the adequacy of the courts' decisions.
This Note will examine the rationale, policies, and history behind the
self-incrimination clause and will demonstrate the privilege's importance
as an individual right and as a check on police power. Only by exploring
the purposes and policies behind the privilege-an approach condoned
by the Supreme Court 4-is one able to formulate the best answer to
whether the self-incrimination clause extends to persons in fear of foreign prosecution.' An understanding of what the privilege is supposed to
protect will lead to a better understanding of the scope of this important
constitutional guarantee. This Note will then focus on recent cases in
which courts have substituted domestic grants of immunity and sealing
orders, issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for fifth
amendment protections. Courts and commentators have questioned the
sufficiency of these substitutes, and this Note will discuss the problems
presented and possible solutions.
While several circuits have confronted the constitutional question, the
Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari and has never directly
addressed this issue. Because domestic grants of immunity cannot protect

3. Id.
4. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964),
Justice Goldberg addressed the similar question of whether "one jurisdiction in our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him
under the laws of another jurisdiction.'.' Id. at 54. To this difficult issue, he responded:

"The answer to this question must depend, of course, on whether such an application of
the privilege promotes or defeats its policies and purposes." Id.

5. This is not an attempt to discern "the framers' intent" but is instead a focus on
the policies behind the privilege from the time it was first developed in 17th century

England to present day constitutional interpretations.
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against foreign prosecutions, the only reasonable solution in harmony
with the objectives of the self-incrimination clause may be an official
promise not to extradite the person to the foreign country. While giving
full effect to the constitutional guarantee, this remedy might place a burden on United States foreign relations. This Note will suggest possible
remedies to this dilemma.
II.

THE POLICIES BEHIND THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE

Two primary theories exist to explain the purpose behind the selfincrimination clause.' The first theory is that the privilege is systemically-based and was initially conceived as a device to prevent oppressive
police tactics, torture, and otherwise aberrant government behavior. The
second theory grounds the privilege on a principle of individual rights
and holds that the government violates the right of privacy by forcing a
person to divulge thoughts in a manner designed to incriminate that person. One leading commentator, after enumerating thirteen widely held
rationales, 7 set forth these two theories:
The significant purposes of the privilege

....

are two: The first is to re-

move the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive
tactics by a zealous questioner. The second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual is sovereign and that proper rules of battle
between government and individual require that the individual not be
bothered for less than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponent
to defeat himself.'
How the courts view the policies behind the privilege largely may determine the issue at hand. If the court believes that the self-incrimination
clause is systemically-based, then it may insulate a witness from the dangers of a foreign prosecution by issuing grants of immunity, sealing or6. While there are a number of possible rationales, see, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55,
(Justice Goldberg lists seven possibilities), commentators have grouped the rationales
under two general headings. See Dolinko, Is There A Rationalefor the PrivilegeAgainst
Self-incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1986) (Dolinko categorizes the rationales as "systemic" and "individual," but because the latter rationale arises out of the
current preference for rights-based thinking among legal philosophers, this Note will
refer to the "individual" rationale as "rights-based.").
7. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its ConstitutionalAffectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
AND POLICE ScL 138, 142-150 (1960). McNaughton also noted that "almost as many
purposes have been suggested as there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, or as there are
uses for a screwdriver." Id. at 142.
8. McNaughton, supra note 7, at 150-151.
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ders, and other government or court ordered protections, avoiding the
need for the fifth amendment's additional protection. On the other hand,
if the privilege is based on individual rights, then no amount of protection can insure that a court will respect a witness's privacy. Although the
most logical possibility is that the rationale is predicated on both theories, an examination of each theory separately is the proper analytical
starting point.
A.

The Systemic Rationale

The Framers' intent in including the self-incrimination clause in the
Bill of Rights was probably systemically-based. The history of the clause
indicates that a fear of government persecution was a foremost concern.
The first known instance in which an accused claimed the privilege occurred during the days of the ecclesiastical courts and the English Star
Chamber. Initially limited in scope,' the privilege began to assume a
more comprehensive, and also modern, interpretation in the famous trial
of Lilburne before the Star Chamber in 1627.1" In sixteenth century
England the bishops had the authority to administer oaths to clergy and
laymen suspected of having weak faith or ill morals. The purpose of the
oaths was to allow these persons the opportunity to clear themselves,1 1
and thus authorities deemed a refusal to speak or to take the oath as
equivalent to a confession of guilt. 2 During the trial, Lilburne refused
to swear an oath and be "ensnared by answering things concerning other
men.""3 Lilburne claimed that no one could force him to incriminate
himself and withstood floggings and beatings while making his statement
against government oppression.
Just a few years after Lilburne's challenge, the government disbanded
the Star Chamber and compensated Lilburne for his injuries. Thereafter,
the privilege against self-incrimination began to assume an increasing
importance in English law.14 The privilege was also transmitted in turn
9. Initially the privilege did not extend to persons under investigation in a proper
proceeding. The privilege was applied to the inquisitorial method of the canon law, in
which accusations could be made by rumor, as long as they were authenticated by at
least two persons. Id. at 8.
10. Id.
11. For a more complete discussion, see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1930).
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 8-9. Some commentators have tried to distinguish this as the origin of the
fifth amendment by claiming that in the days of the Star Chamber one was not incriminating one's self, but one was forced to accuse one's self. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
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to the United States. Justice Goldberg, reflecting a fear of police power,
wrote that the United States has a societal preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of justice and a societal fear of inhuman and abusive treatment. 15 The abuses allowed by the English government possibly led to Griswold's famous quote that the fifth amendment privilege is "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make
himself civilized." 16
Whether or not the privilege originated from the abuses of the Star
Chamber and ecclesiastical courts, 17 the privilege has since been understood partially as a means to forestall governmental oppression and tyranny."8 The concern is that without the privilege governments would use
oppressive police tactics, foregoing standard fact-finding and investigative
procedures in favor of the "easier" method of torture, beatings, and grueling questioning.1 While torture and other oppressive forms of police
behavior are not common today, it is difficult to determine whether this
is a result of the fifth amendment protections or some other cause. While
commentators have suggested that other constitutional provisions exist to
protect against this type of evil,2 ° namely due process, 2 they recognize

Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 677-78
(1968); LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-IN-

(1968).
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
Others have thought that the fifth amendment origin may have been based in
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15.
16.
17.

13th Century Hebrew law, and generally in the Halakhah, where the concern was to
save man from his own destructive inclinations. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493, 497 n.5 (1967) (quoting Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and its Equivalent in Jewish Law, 17 DECALOGUE J. 1, 12 (1967)). This argument has been countered, however,
by the conclusion that there is no proof that Talmudic references had any effect on the
development of the privilege. LEVY, supra note 14, at 439-441.
18. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1077-87; McKay, Self-Incrimination and the
New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT.REV. 193, 209 (1967); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 75
(1955); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 2251, at 317 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
19. One author noted that this shortcut method is based on laziness: "It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes
than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence." I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883).

20. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1079.
21. Professor Dolinko cites a number of cases using due process to protect persons
from government transgressions. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)
(interrogation without sleep); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (stripping the
defendant and holding him incommunicado); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)
(threatening to arrest the defendant's ailing wife). See also Dolinko, supra note 6, at
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the privilege as an important and indispensable part of our legal
system.2 2
Scholars have suggested additional systemic rationales for the privilege. Many scholars who have looked at the issue consider the privilege
as a preventive measure against harassment, as insurance that the government will bear the full burden of proving guilt,2" and as a means to
protect citizens from McCarthy-like inquisitions.24 One commentator offered a more general theory of furthering the public's belief in the fairness of the criminal justice system.2 5 Others attempt to base the privilege
on evidentiary grounds claiming that compelled testimony is inherently
untrustworthy because of the natural reluctance to incriminate oneself
and the attractive alternative to commit perjury. Compelled testimony
leads to the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.2
Each theory points to a general belief about how our criminal justice
system should work. While each theory may be countered, the many
suggested systemic causes attest to the importance of the privilege in this
regard.
Common perceptions of the fifth amendment may also further societal
protection. The privilege comforts those who fear that their ideas may
incriminate them and psychologically restrains police officers and prosecutors. Officials who are aware of the privilege may act with less abandon knowing a check exists on their actions.2"
B.

The Rights-Based Rationale

Courts have interpreted the Constitution as conferring broad "fundamental rights" upon all individuals.2" Thus, it is not surprising that

1079 n.92.
22. See id. at 1064. See also McNaughton, supra note 7, at 153-54 (noting the impact that one firmly entrenched legal principle has on the entire system).
23. This was named as one of Justice Goldberg's rationales for the privilege in Murphy, 328 U.S. at 55.
24. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1080. See also Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
25. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1088.
26. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
27. The focus of Dolinko's article is on disproving or discrediting each of the rationales put forward in support of the self-incrimination clause. While not all of the rationales are convincing, they each have merit and provide a thought-provoking analysis. See
Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1070-1090 (arguments against systemic rationales).
28. Address by Professor Donald Hall, Conference on "The Fifth Amendment and
Original Intent," sponsored by the Center for Judicial Studies (Feb. 12, 1987).
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Constitution includes a fundamental right to have an abortion).
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many recent works on the privilege attempt to base it on concepts of
individual human rights.30 Two theories arise from this human rights
approach to explain the basis for the rights guaranteed by the self-incrimination clause. The first theory provides that compelled testimony is
intolerably cruel and violates the common notion of what a human being
should have to endure. The second theory holds that compelled testimony
violates the individual's right to privacy."1 Both of these theories rest on
the idea that the individual, much like the state, is sovereign. Justice
Fortas, drawing on John Locke's theory of government as a contract between the individual and the state, wrote that the sovereign individual
does not yield to the sovereign state the power to compel evidence of
guilt. 2 Justice Fortas considered the state and its citizens as equals,
neither of whom could exert undue influence over the other. In one opinion, he compared the criminal trial to "equals meeting in battle" in
which the sovereign state "has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his right of self-defense." 33 The sovereign
individual is vested with all the rights and guarantees that the Constitution confers and from these inherent rights spring the cruelty and privacy theories.
The cruelty argument holds that compelled self-incrimination is intolerably cruel because it forces people to harm themselves.3 4 But why is it
''cruel" to compel testimony? Rather than focusing on the possible penal
effects that may result from the incriminating testimony, the theory focuses on the act of speaking the incriminating words. Forcing a person
into this awkward position is somehow cruel. Justice Goldberg articulated this notion stating that society has an "unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt. '"" The cruelty apparently occurs when officials force someone to choose between these three alternatives, each a no-win situation. 6

30. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1090. See also Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: SelfIncrimination and PrivatePapers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REv. 343 (1979);
Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970).
31. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1090.
32. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.
ASS'N J. 91, 98-100 (1954).
33. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
34. See Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15 (1981). See generally Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1090-1107 (discussing the various cruelty arguments and responses to them).
35. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
36. See generally Westen & Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging
Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred Response," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521
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Silence is the only acceptable alternative.
Critics of this rationale argue that persons not testifying in a selfincriminating context often face similar dilemmas. For example, one who
is subpoenaed to testify against gang or mafia members faces the alternatives of perjury or contempt, as well as fear of death or injury.37 In such
instances, the witness cannot rely on the protections of the fifth amendment. Thus, critics assert that because the privilege does not extend to
these cases, its rationale cannot be predicated solely on cruelty.3 8 The
criticism fails, however, because it does not recognize the fact that by its
very terms the fifth amendment cannot offer protection in these cases.
The wording of the amendment applies only to self-incriminating testimony."2 The fifth amendment cannot extend beyond its literal language.
The privacy rationale is equally compelling. In Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York HarborJustice Goldberg made privacy an element to consider stating that the privilege is partly based on "our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life'."' 40 Proponents of the theory argue that making a person reveal information that
would prove incriminating under law is an unwarranted and unjustifiable intrusion into that individual's life. Commentators have based the
need for the "private enclave" on the belief that the state should not have
access to an individual's thoughts."1 Furthermore, when the state seeks
access to potentially incriminating information the necessity of protecting
the "private enclave" is heightened. Another proposition is that the state
has no interest in compelling testimony regarding matters of personal
importance. For example, Judge Friendly noted that the privacy rationale may apply with even greater force when the incriminating offenses
are crimes such as adultery and fornication and when the questioning
centers on associations, ideas, and beliefs. 2

(1982).
37. Dolinko, supra note 6, at 1094. Dolinko also notes the dilemma posed by a rape
victim: either relive the experience while testifying and face humiliating cross-examination, or let the assailant go free. Id. For examples of these dilemmas see id. at 1094,
n.165.
38. Id. at 1094-95.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment reads in part: "No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
40. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting U.S. v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d.
Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
41. See Aranella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 41-42 (1982).
42. Friendly, supra note 14, at 689.
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Proponents of the privacy argument conclude that individuals have a
' although logically this argument leads to the
general "right to silence," 43
"absurd conclusion that the state cannot compel evidence from anybody." 44 As with all constitutional rights, however, courts can conceivably set aside the "right to a private enclave" in favor of a compelling
state interest.4 5 When the state's interest is overriding, the possibility of
granting immunity acts as an effective guard against prosecution. In
cases of murder, rape, and other felonious conduct, Judge Friendly contends that the state interest in protecting society outweighs the individual's interest in privacy.46 This does not mean, however, that the privilege should be done away with in felony cases; it only means that this
particular rationale of a "right to a private enclave" fails when applied
to felonies.
C.

How Should the Privilege Be Understood?

The Supreme Court wrote that the privilege against self-incrimination
"reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations." 47
The many purposes underlying the privilege prevents its ascription to
any single rationale. Justice Harlan, reflecting this idea, once commented
that "[t]he Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calculate the areas

. . .

to which the privilege should extend, and the Court

has therefore been obliged to fashion for itself standards for the application of the privilege." 48 The Court, however, has been unable to establish any consistent framework in which to place the privilege. The privilege represents all things to all persons; it provides a check on the
system, and it attempts to maintain integrity in judicial and governmental bodies. Yet the privilege is also viewed as an inviolable human right.
Recognition of all these underlying purposes is necessary in order to
properly view the privilege. While the Court's opinion in Murphy certainly may offer guidance, 49 lower courts often manipulate the various
43. Some commentators have argued that the right not to speak could actually be
based on the first, and not the fifth amendment. McKay wrote: "If the right to speak and
write without official restraint is guaranteed by the First Amendment, as all agree is the
case, does it not follow that there is a parallel freedom not to speak and not to write?"
McKay, supra note 18, at 212. This implies a right of silence, which also includes the
specific right not to incriminate oneself. Id.
44. Friendly, supra note 14, at 690.
45. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
46. Friendly, supra note 14, at 690.
47. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
48. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Murphy, 378 U.S. 52.
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purposes of the privilege in order to suit their ends. Courts hoping to
further law enforcement and uncover evidence minimize the importance
of rights-based rationales." Conversely, rights-based proponents tend to
ignore the fact that the privilege provides a check on government oppression and has originally served predominantly practical purposes. 1 In
Murphy the Court recognized, at least in passing, all of the major rationales put forward in defense of the privilege. 52 The Murphy decision,
however, is deficient because the Court did not rely on any of these rationales in fashioning its opinion. The Court instead decided the case by
reference to English cases and by incorporating the fifth amendment into
the fourteenth amendment. 3
Courts should recognize, as in Murphy, that the privilege serves varied
purposes. But unlike Murphy, courts should rely on this background in
making their decisions. In deciding whether the privilege applies when
the person fears foreign prosecution, courts should consider whether the
"cruel trilemma" is still present. A witness may be well aware that perjury and contempt pose attractive alternatives to the possibility of placing
oneself in the prisons of a foreign country. While domestic grants of immunity may circumvent one's "privacy" and right not to speak, no parallel protection exists to prevent the use of incriminating testimony in a
foreign court.
III.

THE HISTORICAL APPROACH

The historic approach to the question of foreign prosecution involves
establishing a series of litmus tests before reaching the constitutional
question. A real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution and a realistic fear of disclosure of one's testimony are the two established tests that
the person must satisfy before the courts will consider the constitutional
question. Until recently, these tests have prevented the courts from even
considering the constitutional question. 5

50. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (focusing on procedural safeguards favors the government).

51. See R.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 83-83 (1977); HART, Between
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198 (1983).

Utility and Rights, in

52. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
53.

Id.

54. See United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986)
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A. The Supreme Court's Position: Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor
In Murphy the Supreme Court provided some insight into whether the
self-incrimination clause extends to persons in fear of foreign prosecution. 55 In that case, the petitioners were subpoenaed to testify concerning
a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey piers. The petitioners refused to testify on the ground that their answers would tend to incriminate them. Although both New Jersey and New York granted them immunity under state law,5" the petitioners still refused to testify because
they believed their testimony was incriminating under federal law as
well.5" Since the state grants of immunity did not extend to prosecution
under federal law, petitioners feared that their testimony in state court
would be used against them in a federal proceeding.5" The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a state may constitutionally compel a witness to
give testimony that might prove to be self-incriminating in a federal
prosecution.5 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed.6" In reaching its decision,
the Court overturned a number of Supreme Court cases holding that a
privilege granted in one jurisdiction does not extend to another jurisdiction. 61 The Court stated that the prior cases had not adequately considered certain critical factors and that subsequent decisions had further
weakened these cases.6 2 After discussing the privilege's policies, however,

55. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 54.
56. The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor was a multi-state organization. Id. at 53 n.2.
57. Id. at 53-54.
58. Prior to Murphy and its companion case, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
the fifth amendment was not incorporated through the fourteenth amendment and did
not apply to the states.
59. 378 U.S. at 54, citing the lower court case, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 39
N.J. 436, 452-58, 189 A.2d 36, 46-49 (1963).
60. Murphy, 378 U.S. 52.
61. Id. at 57. This rule had three facets: the federal government could compel a
statement that would incriminate under state law, United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S.
141 (1931); a state can compel testimony that might incriminate under federal law,
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); and, testimony compelled by a state can be
introduced as evidence in a federal court, Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487

(1944).
62. The Court wrote: "Our review of the pertinent cases in this Court and of their
English antecedents reveals that Murdock did not adequately consider the relevant authorities and has been significantly weakened by subsequent decisions of this Court, and,
further, that the legal premises underlying Feldman and Knapp have since been rejected." Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57.
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Justice Goldberg examined century-old English cases6 3 with the hope
that precedent could somehow reveal where past courts had gone astray.
The Court was careful not to overrule the past cases on the ground that
it had changed its interpretation of the Constitution; instead, the Court
based its decision on the inability of prior courts to discern the "true"
English rule regarding the applicability of the privilege to foreign
jurisdictions.
The Murphy Court criticized United States v. Murdok,6 4 which held
that the federal government could compel a statement that would prove
incriminating under state law, because in that case the Court failed to
cite the correct English rule. Under the English rule, as stated in Murdock, a person may be compelled to disclose information which would
incriminate that person under the laws of another country. 5 However,
the Murphy Court found that the "true" English rule extended the privilege to those in fear of foreign prosecution. 66 The Murdock Court did
not uncover the case that established the correct rule, and it was on this
67
mistake that the Murphy Court based its decision to overrule.
Although Murphy contains an excellent summary of the privilege's
purposes and policies,6 8 the Court chose to predicate its decision on the
research mistakes of past courts. Regardless of the Court's rationale,
however, its apparent support for the true English rule-that a person is
protected in all jurisdictions-reveals its belief that the self-incrimination
clause extends to protect persons in fear of foreign prosecution. A recent
stay of a contempt order by then Chief Justice Burger supports this
conclusion.6 9
B.

Real and Substantial Fear of Foreign Prosecution

In Murphy the Supreme Court did not directly address the question of
foreign prosecutions, and subsequent courts similarly have been reluctant

63. Id. at 58-63.
64. 284 U.S. 141.
65. Id. at 149. This rule was contained in an 1851 English case, King of the Two
Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N.S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (1851). The "true" rule, however, was not in this case, but in the a case which overruled it just sixteen years later.
United States of America v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. App. 79 (1867).
66. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 63. The Court wrote: "This decision [McRae], not King of
the Two Sicilies, represents the settled 'English rule' regarding self-incrimination under
foreign law." See also Heriz v. Riera, 11 Sim. 318, 59 Eng. Rep. 896 (1840).
67. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. The court cites seven distinct purposes behind the privilege and cites cases in
support of each. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
69. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
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to do so. Instead, courts have established a series of hurdles which the
person must pass before the court will reach the constitutional question.
0 the
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation"
United States Supreme Court held that a "real and substantial fear of
foreign prosecution" must exist before a court may consider the fifth
amendment question. 1 Asked to testify concerning organized crime,
racketeering, and political corruption, the appellant Zicarelli invoked his
fifth amendment privilege one hundred times during the course of the
proceedings. 2 The state commissioner then granted him immunity73 and
compelled him to answer the questions. Zicarelli argued that the grant of
immunity was not sufficient because he was still unprotected from foreign prosecutions. A number of magazine articles had labelled the appellant as the "foremost internationalist" in organized crime, and Mr. Zicarelli contended that this, as well as other factors,' 4 created a real and
substantial fear that5 he would face prosecution in Canada and the Do7
minican Republic.
Zicarelli made a specific objection to only one of the one hundred queries directed to him. He felt that the question "In what geographical
area do you have Cosa Nostra responsibilities?" 76 would incriminate him
under foreign law. The Court determined that when reviewing a claim
of privilege a court should focus on what a truthful answer might reveal77 by considering the circumstances of the case in which the question
is asked.78 The Court found that because the prosecutor asked the question during the course of a domestic investigation, an answer with regard
79
to foreign involvements would "volunteer information not sought."1
Thus, because Zicarelli could have answered the question without incriminating himself under foreign law, the Court concluded that he had

70. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
71. Id. The real and substantial fear test was well established before Zicarelli. In
fact, the privilege has never extended to fears that were remote or speculative. See, e.g.,
Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144
(1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896).
72. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 474.
73. Pursuant to N.J. REv. STAT. 52:9M-17(a) (1970).
74. Mr. Zicarelli had a number of holdings in Venezuela which he felt might lead to
foreign prosecution, but this assertion was summarily dismissed by the Court as too tenuous. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 479.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 480. The Cosa Nostra is a part of the Joseph Bonanno "family." Id. at
479 n.17.
77. Id. at 480, citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
78. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 480.
79. Id. at 481.
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no real fear of foreign prosecution.
Zicarelli established a hurdle upon which many subsequent cases have
stumbled: the requirement of a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. Some commentators have suggested that Zicarelli announced a
second requirement: that a witness establish that his or her testimony
might actually prove incriminating under foreign law.80 Courts, however, generally have not adopted this second requirement in succeeding
cases.81 Courts have employed the "real and substantial fear of prosecution" test in every subsequent decision and in doing so have kept many
unnecessary cases out of the system.
Courts have interpreted a realistic fear of prosecution in a variety of
ways. In deciding federal-state jurisdictional questions some courts have
established a legal standard for proving "realistic fear." These courts
have held that the mere possibility of prosecution removes a case from
the realm of imagination and speculation, constituting a realistic fear of
prosecution. 2 Although courts generally apply a higher standard for foreign courts, the standard is unclear. 83 For example, one court held that a
real fear of foreign prosecution did not exist, even though the suspect
was charged with smuggling narcotics from Canada and faced extradition based on a mutual cooperation treaty between the United States and
Canada.8 4 In In re GrandJury Subpoena of Flanaganthe Second Circuit established the most authoritative and frequently used test for determining whether a cognizable danger of foreign prosecution exists. This
test consists of several factors a court should consider in deciding whether
or not to allow a witness to invoke the privilege:
whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of him; what

80. Feldman, The Fifth Amendment, Self-Incrimination, and Foreign Prosecution:
The Saga of the Ryuyo Marv, 11 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 119, 133 (1982).
81. See United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d at 923 ("Zicarelli teaches that a
court should first determine that the witness confronts a 'real and substantial' risk of
foreign prosecution." There is no mention of the second requirement.). But see United
States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 943 (2d Cir. 1977) (the court required that Yanagita
meet two tests: first, that a real danger exists of disclosing incriminating information; and
second, that a real and substantial fear exists that prosecution might actually ensue).
82. In re Samuelson, 763 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1985). See also In re Master Key
Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974) (privilege does not depend on likelihood,
but on possibility of prosecution); Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d
1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1979).
83. Samuelson, 763 F.2d at 324 n.4 (citing In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982).
84. Baird, 668 F.2d 432. The treaty was the 1961 Multilateral Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, 18 U.S.T. 1407, and its 1972 Amending Protocol, 26 U.S.T. 1439.
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foreign charges could be filed against him; whether prosecution of them
would be initiated or furthered by his testimony; whether any such
charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have him extradited from
the United States; and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony
given here would be disclosed to the foreign government."5
One factor that courts have found extremely persuasive is whether an
investigation and prosecution is currently underway in a foreign country.
In United States v. (Under Seal) the court began its discussion by noting
that the Philippine government had already initiated a prosecution
against the defendants. 8 Conversely, the absence of a foreign prosecution
is also a critical factor. The lack of an ongoing or pending suit drastically diminishes the chance of a court finding a "real and substantial
fear" of foreign prosecution. 7
Courts confronted with this type of question consistently employ the
Zicarelli test requiring a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
Although Zicarelli did not resolve the ultimate constitutional question,8 8
the case nevertheless established a crucial hurdle and provides a manageable standard without attempting to address various constitutional remedies. By applying the Zicarelli test, only the most compelling cases reach
the constitutional question 89 and baseless fifth amendment claims and
attempts to circumvent grants of immunity are prevented.
C.

Realistic Fear of Disclosure

Many court decisions have emphasized the existence of a realistic fear
that testimony will be disclosed to the foreign government. In trying to
establish fear of disclosure, defendants have proposed a variety of arguments ranging from a possibility of accidental disclosure9" to fear that
Soviet agents could be present in a courtroom.91 The issue of disclosure
is hotly contested concerning testimony before grand juries. In these instances, courts have faced the question of whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 2 adequately protects a witness from disclosure of his

85. United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d. Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Chevrier, 748 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Gilboe, 699 F.2d
71, 75 (2d Cir. 1983).
86. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 924.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Barstech, 643 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D.I1. 1986);
United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1986).
88. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472.
89. See Under Seal, 794 F.2d 920; infra notes 113-48 and accompanying text.
90. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 925.
91. Joudis, 800 F.2d at 162.
92.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in relevant part:
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or her testimony to a foreign court.9 3 That Rule purports to protect
statements made before a grand jury from disclosure to outside parties.
Numerous exceptions allowing disclosure substantially erode the effectiveness of Rule 6(e)'s secrecy provisions. For example, section
6(e)(3)(A)(i) allows government attorneys to access grand jury materials
without a court order. The Supreme Court strictly construes the exceptions by specifically stating that, absent a clear indication otherwise,

(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be
made to(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's
duty; and
(ii) such government personnel . . . as are deemed necessary . . . to enforce
federal criminal law.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters
occurring before the grand jury; [or]
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another
federal grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the
court may direct.
(6) Sealed Records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to
prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.
93. Compare Nigro v. United States, 705 F.2d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); Baird, 668 F.2d 432; In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Rule 6(e) adequately protects against likelihood of disclosure to a foreign
government), with Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 925; Chevrier, 748 F.2d at 103-04; Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123-24; United States v. Lemieux, 597 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (9th Cir.
1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) (a sealing order is not conclusive with respect to possible disclosure to foreign governments).
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breaches of secrecy are presumed unauthorized. 94 One judge has noted,
however, that government attorneys could send transcripts of grand jury
testimony to foreign countries upon request without first making an application to the court.9 5 With such a possibility of foreign access to transcripts, a court may be unaware that the record of a witness's testimony
is finding its way outside the United States.
Section 6(e)(3)(C)(i) allows court-ordered disclosure "preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding." 9' 6 It is unclear whether the
definition of a judicial proceeding under Rule 6(e) embraces the idea of
judicial proceedings abroad.97 The Eighth Circuit, addressing the issue
in dicta, concluded that the definition includes judicial proceedings
abroad. In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote that it "assume[d],"
without deciding, that the phrase 'judicial proceeding' includes a criminal trial conducted in a foreign country."" Courts will not order disclosure under this section, however, without a showing of "particularized
need." 9 Courts require this "need" to be satisfied by a three-part test
establishing that: (1) absence of the material would lead to a possible
injustice in another proceeding; (2) the need for the material outweighs
the need for secrecy; and (3) the disclosure is limited to material necessary to avoid injustice.' Whether this test is applicable and could be
satisfied in foreign proceedings is unclear.
Clearly, the United States has legitimate interests in making disclosure
to foreign governments under either of the exceptions described above.' '
Reciprocal cooperation, °2 maintenance of foreign relations, 0 3 and savings of time and money by allowing other governments to prosecute our
criminals 0 4 all constitute valid reasons to disclose information. Although

94. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1983).
95. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D.Conn. 1972).
96. See supra note 92.
97. See Gilboe, 699 F.2d at 78.
98. Baird, 668 F.2d at 434 n.3.
99. The particularized need requirement was first added in United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), and later revised in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
100. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.

101.

See generally Note, Disclosure of GrandJuy Materials to Foreign Authorities

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 70 VA. L. REV. 1623, 1630-1633

(1984).
102. Id. at 1631.
103. Id. Denying requests for information could damage relations with foreign governments. Id. at 1632.
104. If federal authorities have granted immunity, or evidence is inadmissible in this
country, or prosecution in a foreign country would better serve the interests of justice,
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one judge has expressed concern that the disclosure could be made by an
attorney for the government,10 5 the Eighth Circuit has discounted this
fear.10 6 The more likely way for disclosure is through the "judicial proceeding" exception. 107 But does the United States have an interest in the
"injustice" that might stem from a foreign government not having access
to grand jury testimony? At least one commentator believes that a justifiable interest exists when the United States determines that the foreign
government will conduct the adjudication with "fundamental
fairness."' '
Rule 6(e) does not provide an adequate answer to the question of disclosure. The rule has numerous exceptions, and once the information is
disclosed no remedy exists to repair the damage. However, a section
1983 action certainly would be appropriate'0 9 as an after-the-fact damages remedy. If the situation satisfies the Zicarelli test, then it can satisfy
the realistic fear of disclosure test in one of three ways: (1)if Rule 6(e)
provides insufficient protection; (2) if the case goes beyond the grand
jury stage to trial, when the rule will lose its effect; and (3) if disclosure
is made in violation of the rule. The Supreme Court has never been
presented with a case in which a person claimed the privilege at trial,
where the procedural grand jury rule loses its effect. Such a fact pattern
would present a much more compelling case.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

The "real and substantial fear" test and the "realistic fear of disclosure" requirement have posed significant barriers that the person claiming the privilege must overcome before the courts will reach the constitutional question. Courts only recently have begun to reach the question of
whether the self-incrimination clause extends the right to remain silent
to persons in fear of foreign prosecution. Although a few courts have
reached the constitutional question," 0 the most recent cases have been of
particular interest because they involve the Marcos family. In United
then every reason exists to disclose the testimony and allow a foreign sovereign to do
work that the United States cannot. Id.
105. See Lemieux, 597 F.2d at 1168 (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
106. Baird, 668 F.2d at 433.
107. Although this is the more likely procedure for disclosure if normal channels are
followed, with a number of individuals having access to transcripts, the potential for
accidental disclosure is still an ever present possibility under the prior exception.
108. See Note, supra note 101, at 1637-47.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
110. See, e.g., Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981); United
States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Cardassi,351 F. Supp. 1080.
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States v. (Under Seal).1 the court provided an extensive analysis of the
constitutional question based on a compelling fact scenario. Subsequently, in Araneta v. United States the petitioners applied for a stay of
a contempt order to Chief Justice Burger. 12 The Under Seal opinion
reached one conclusion, and Chief Justice Burger in Araneta hinted at
another. The Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari and created a
confused state of affairs.
A.

United States v. (UnderSeal)

A grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia was investigating
arms contracts with the Philippines and allegations of corruption when
Gregorio and Irene Araneta fled to the United States."' About two
months after their arrival, authorities served them with grand jury subpoenas and granted them immunity. In spite of these grants, the
Aranetas, asserting their fifth amendment privilege, refused to testify.' 1 4
In its analysis, the court noted that the United States and the Republic
of the Philippines are parties to an extradition treaty." 5 In addition, the
court discussed an affidavit signed by the United States Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs clearly expressing "the extreme importance
the United States attaches to favorable relations with the Philippines and
declares that it is the policy of the United States to strengthen and
broaden those relations.""' 6 The court also stated that the two governments had entered into a mutual legal assistance agreement just one
week after concluding arguments in the case.1 7 Each of these factors
influenced the court's resolution of the fear of prosecution and the fear of
disclosure issues and offered a greater understanding of the court's
decision.
The facts indicated a strong possibility that the Aranetas could return
to the Philippines and face prosecution. Although the United States was

111. 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
112. 107 S. Ct. 1 (1986) (Burger, C.J., acting as Circuit Justice).
113. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 921. The defendants were the daughter and son-in-law
of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.
114. Id. at 922.
115. The treaty has not been ratified by the Senate.
116. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 922 (taken from the Under Secretary's affidavit).
117. Id. "The accord commits the two signatories to share evidence in the legal investigations of specific corporations and individuals alleged to have provided kickbacks to
obtain military and public works contracts. The two governments also have agreed to
assist each other in arranging interviews with potential witnesses and locating additional
evidence." Id.
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not bound officially by the extradition treaty, 8 Senate approval of the
treaty could impose an obligation to extradite the couple."' The court
noted that it was not a "remote or speculative" 2 ' possibility that the
United States might return the couple to the Philippines against their
will, since their continued presence was wholly dependent on the discretionary authority of the Attorney General.1 2 ' The established policy of
the United States government was "to aid and assist the Aquino government in its pursuit of Philippine interests with respect to the Marcos
regime."' 2 2 Finally, the Aranetas stated that they "may voluntarily
choose to return to their country at a future date."11 2 3 The court found
this set of facts particularly compelling. The national and international
attention focused on the Marcos family, coupled with the importance of
the new Aquino government, made cooperation a necessity for stable foreign relations. The court ultimately held that the Aranetas clearly met
the Zicarelli test because most likely they would return, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to the Philippines and almost surely face
prosecution.
The court next addressed the question of whether the protective order
entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) reduced
the possibility of disclosure "as to render inconsequential the risk that
the Aranetas' grand jury testimony will be used against them in the
Philippines."' 2 4 Although the petitiofiers' testimony was available to
only eight prosecutorial officials, the compelling facts of this case' 26 led
the court to recognize that the case might generate tensions that could
lead to "inadvertent" disclosure. 2 In addition, the protective order did
2
not prevent disclosure of evidence derived from a witness's testimony.1 7
The Court also pointed out the most glaring deficiency in the rule: the
protections only apply to grand jury testimony. The Court noted that

118. Id. at 924.
119. Id.
120. Id. In Zicarellithe Court stated that in order to establish a real and substantial
fear of foreign prosecution facts other than "remote and speculative" facts must be
present.
121. Id. at 924.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The court stated: "This is not a simple case charging a garden variety of criminal conduct. Rather, this case involves a former head of state, whose alleged illicit gains
are measurable only by the billions of dollars. Id. at 925.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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"should the Aranetas testify before the grand jury, and should the grand
jury return an indictment, the Aranetas could be called as witnesses at
the ensuing trial."'1 2 No rule of secrecy exists at trial to prevent disclosure. Considering these factors, the court concluded that the order pursuant to Rule 6(e) did not obviate the need to determine the fifth amendment question. 12 9 In addition, the United States government was under
extraordinary pressures that most likely would cause disclosure under
either the government attorney or judicial proceeding exception.1"'
Addressing the constitutional question, the court first recognized the
fact that petitioners could not use the fifth amendment before a Philippine court if the Philippines countenanced the use of testimony compelled by a grant of immunity.1 1 The Philippines could ignore United
States constitutional protections based on the widely accepted principle
that a domestic provision of law, even constitutional law, is binding only
on the enacting jurisdiction.13 2 Thus, no guarantee existed that the Philippine government would honor the immunity that the United States
gave to the Aranetas.
Forced to answer the constitutional question, the court made an analogy to the period of United States history when courts held that the fifth
amendment was not applicable to the states.1 3 When the self-incrimination clause applied only to federal prosecutions, the federal government
could compel testimony that would incriminate a person under state
law;13 likewise, a state could compel testimony that would incriminate
the individual under federal law." 5 From this history, the court concluded that "the Fifth Amendment privilege applies only where the sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony
are both restrained by the fifth amendment from compelling self-incrimination." 1 8 Based on this conclusion, the court posited that the fifth
amendment might have extraterritorial effect if the United States con-

128. Id.
129. Id. The court noted contrary authority, Nigro, 705 F.2d 1224, 1227; Baird,
668 F.2d 432; Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, but acknowledged that the facts at hand were far
more compelling than the facts of those cases.
130. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
131. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 925.

132. Id.
133. Id. This period lasted until 1964, when the Supreme Court incorporated the
fifth amendment into the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).

135. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
136. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 926.
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trolled or unduly influenced the foreign proceeding. 13 7 While this argument has some practical appeal,1"8 it reduces the significance of the
rights-based rationales that underlie the privilege.1 "
If it is unnecessarily cruel to force people into the trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury, or contempt in a domestic proceeding, 4" it is no less
cruel when the fear is of prosecution in a foreign court proceeding. In
addition, the fear of self-incrimination, regardless of where the penal effects of that incrimination may occur, carries with it the accompanying
trilemma. The reliability of the compelled testimony is also suspect because perjury becomes an attractive alternative. 41 If domestic self-incrimination invades a person's general right to "privacy,"1 42 testimony
that will prove incriminating in another country similarly will impinge
upon this right. Courts143 and commentators14 4 have agreed that the
cruel trilemma, decreased reliability, and the right of privacy are appropriate rationales behind the privilege. Nevertheless, the Under Seal court
did not give them sufficient credence.
The court in Under Seal weighed the importance of individual freedoms against the necessity of government fact-finding, and the government interests prevailed. The court noted that it had done "everything in
its power to relieve the pressure [posed by the cruel trilemma] by granting the Aranetas use and derivative use immunity"1 45 and thus concluded it would have been intolerable to forego valuable, legitimate evidence because of possibilities beyond United States control (e.g., the
foreign judicial process).1 46 Contrary to the court's opinion, the government prosecutor could have afforded the Aranetas further protection by
promising not to extradite the Aranetas.
If the courts and the government are concerned about protecting the
constitutional rights of witnesses, then granting political asylum and re137. Id. at 928. The court cited the following cases in support of its position: United
States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1978); Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949). See also Note, The Reach of the Fifth Amendment Privilege When Domestically Compelled Testimony May Be Used in a Foreign Country's Court, 69 VA. L.
REv. 875 (1983).
138. See Note, supra note 137 (cited with approval in Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 926).
139. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text. Even if the United States has no
influence over a foreign proceeding, a witness still faces the cruel trilemma.
140. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
142. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56; see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
143. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56.
144. See supra note 34.
145. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 926.
146. Id.
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fusing to extradite are realistic alternatives to ineffective grants of immunity. Although Justice Goldberg established the "cruel trilemma" rationale almost twenty-five years ago, 147 it remains a valid purpose behind the
privilege.1" 8 While these measures might conflict with foreign policy and
could raise a political question by requiring violation of an extradition
treaty, the executive branch should not have control over the way the
judiciary shapes our constitutional guarantees.
B.

Araneta v. United States

The Aranetas appealed to Chief Justice Burger, acting as Circuit Justice, to stay the lower court's contempt order for refusing to testify.14 9
The Chief Justice, acting as a surrogate for the entire court,1 50 could
grant the stay only upon determining that three factors were present: a
reasonable probability that four Justices would vote to grant certiorari; a
fair prospect that a majority of the Justices would find the decision below clearly erroneous; and, a balancing of the equities in the applicants'
favor.151 In response to the second requirement, the Chief Justice concluded that a "fair prospect" existed that the Court would reverse the
Fourth Circuit decision.152 Although "fair prospect" is not a high standard, Chief Justice Burger noted the importance of the Murphy decision
in deciding the constitutional question.'

53

Certain language in the Murphy decision supports an overruling of
Under Seal. In Murphy the Court discussed several English cases, with
apparent approval, which held that the privilege would prevent a court
from compelling testimony from an individual that would be incriminating in a foreign country's court.'" In the Court's opinion, the English
cases1 5 5 stood for the proposition that the privilege did "not protect wit-

147. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
148. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of rights-based
rationales.
149. Araneta, 107 S. Ct. 1.
150. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 (1973) (Marshall, J., in
chambers).
151. Araneta, 107 S. Ct. at 2. See also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 463 U.S. 1311,
1313 (1983) (White, J., in chambers); Gregory-Portland Indep. School Dist. v. United
States, 448 U.S. 1342, 1342 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
152. Araneta, 107 S.Ct. at 2.
153. Id. For a discussion of Murphy, see supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
154. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 58-63. In Murphy the Court held that the privilege protects a witness against compelled disclosures in state court that could be used against him
or her in federal court. The language examining the English cases is dicta.
155. United States of America v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. App. 79 (1867); Brownsword
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nesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another
country."u 5 Although there was some disagreement about the "true"
English rule, 157 the Court concurred on a definition of the privilege that
18
would support its application to extraterritorial claims.
Justice Burger concluded his opinion by noting the necessity of the
stay order, especially in light of the Court of Appeals' fear that the sealing order might provide an insufficient protection.159 Because the Chief
Justice was speaking for himself and only indirectly for the entire Court
based on a "likelihood" of what the Court would conclude, the opinion
has no precedential value beyond its use in determining stays of contempt orders. Courts, however, have cited this short opinion as authority
for determining the constitutional question. 1 0 Because the Supreme
Court has failed to address the issue directly, the conflict remains. The
United States government has a vested foreign policy interest in making
disclosures to foreign governments, yet the Murphy decision contains
dicta that, if carried to its logical conclusion, would support the proposition that United States courts should recognize that the privilege has extraterritorial effect.
V.

CONCLUSION

A Supreme Court decision resolving the apparent confusion on this
constitutional question and providing clear guidelines and standards is
required. In a stay proceeding similar to the Araneta opinion, Justice
Stevens noted the existence of two questions presented for the Court's
consideration: the constitutional question and "whether sealing orders
adequately protect against disclosure for Fifth Amendment purposes." 61
Courts have failed to answer these questions for too long,' 6 2 and their
importance warrants attention.
The Supreme Court should not resolve the constitutional question
without reference to the purposes behind the privilege. Grants of immunity and sealing orders do not adequately address the "cruel trilemma"
v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (1750); East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010

(1749).
156.

Murphy, 378 U.S. at 72 (quoting McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. App. at 79).

157. 378 U.S. at 67-68.
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Id. at 69.

159. Araneta, 107 S. Ct. at 3.
160. See, e.g.,Joudis, 800 F.2d at 161.
161. Araneta, 107 S. Ct. at 5 n.3.
162. The debate has been ragink since the English cases cited in Murphy were decided almost 250 years ago, and has recently become a question of great interest with the
Marcos family, Under Seal, and the Nazi war criminal Mikutaitis.

19871

SELF-INCRIMINATION AND FOREIGN PROSECUTION

and the privacy rationales. While the United States certainly has an interest in cooperating with foreign governments in law enforcement, the
government should not automatically approve requests for extradition.
Just as a grant of immunity must be coextensive with the privilege, 63
other protections must also be coextensive. If the language in Murphy is
carried to its logical conclusion, then the privilege will extend to protect
persons in fear of foreign prosecution. If the scope of the fifth amendment extends the privilege to such persons, then courts must examine
what protections would be coextensive with the privilege.
The only way to protect a witness who has subjected himself to possible foreign prosecution with compelled self-incriminating testimony is to
insure that the witness never enters the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign
seeking to prosecute. In addition to granting full immunity from domestic prosecution, the United States could aid this goal by promising to
make no attempts to extradite the witness. This approach allows the
United States to gather needed information, while respecting the individual rights of the witness. Furthermore, the infrequency of these situations would indicate that such a rule would not pose significant problems
to United States foreign policy. This approach would protect the rights
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. If courts truly regard the fifth
amendment as an inviolable human right, then there is no other
alternative.
Bret Alan Fausett
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